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APPROVAL VERSUS APPLICATION: How TO INTERPRET
THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT UNDER THE
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
If I were required to guess off-hand, and without collusion with
higher minds, what is the bottom cause of the amazing material and
intellectual advancement of the last fifty years, I should guess that it
was the modem-born and previously non-existent disposition on the
part of men to believe that a new idea can have value.
-Mark Twain
INTRODUCTION
While Mark Twain identified the significance of innovation in the
intellectual and social progress of man, perhaps equally important is the
value an innovation has to its creator. American copyright law has rec-
ognized and struggled with this dichotomy between progress and owner-
ship from the time the first copyright statute was enacted in 1790. 2 In an
effort to balance private incentives and public resources from which fu-
ture innovators could draw, Congress implemented a system of proce-
dural formalities.3 Individuals were permitted to exert control over their
creations only if they complied with the registration, notice, and renewal
requirements of the Copyright Act.4 While the current federal system has
relaxed many of these requirements, procedural formalities continue to
play an important role in copyright law. Although an original work is
protected the moment it is fixed in a tangible form,5 certain rights and
benefits accrue only upon copyright registration. These rights and bene-
fits include: the ability to initiate an infringement action in federal court,6
and to recover statutory damages and attorney's fees.7 Therefore, while
an author may own the copyright in his work as soon as his work is cre-
ated, his ability to enforce the copyright depends on compliance with
registration procedures.
1. Jone Johnson Lewis, Wisdom Quotes: Quotations to Inspire and Challenge,
http://www.wisdomquotes.com/catideas.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
2. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REv. 485, 486-87 (2004).
3. Id. at 487.
4. Id.
5. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 2005) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, ,from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.") (emphasis added).
6. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411 (a) (West 2005).
7. 17 U.S.C.A. § 412 (West 2005).
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In La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire,8 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed two conflicting
interpretations of the registration requirement under the Copyright Act of
1976.9 The determination of whether a copyright has been properly reg-
istered is the preliminary step to initiating an infringement action in fed-
eral court.10 In a case of first impression for the Tenth Circuit, the court
was faced with the task of determining whether a creator had sufficiently
complied with the Copyright Act's registration requirements, thus pro-
viding the court with proper jurisdiction over the case.1 Copyright
claimants may register their copyright claims by submitting a registration
application.' 2 The court held that registration under the Act required the
Copyright Office's review of a registration application rather than just
the successful submission of an application.' 3 Because the plaintiff in La
Resolana initiated suit after successfully submitting an application but
prior to receiving approval, the court dismissed the claim for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. 14
This article examines the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the regis-
tration requirement under the Copyright Act in La Resolana. Part I dis-
cusses the origins and evolution of copyright law, the federal registration
system, and recent amendments to the Copyright Act. It also provides an
overview of the disparate application of registration formalities under
current federal law. Part II addresses the circuit split regarding the pre-
requisites of copyright registration and outlines the two competing inter-
pretations of Title 17: (1) the "Application approach"-a policy based
interpretation where registration is satisfied upon the successful submis-
sion of a copyright application; and (2) the "Approval approach"-a
plain language interpretation where an application must either be ap-
proved or rejected to satisfy the Act's registration requirement. 5 Part III
provides a detailed view of the La Resolana decision and the Tenth Cir-
cuit's reliance on the Approval approach. Part IV analyzes this decision
and proposes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
8. 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005).
9. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1197.
10. See id. at 1199.
11. See id. at 1197.
12. 17 U.S.C.A. § 408(a) (West 2005) states:
At any time during the subsistence of the first term of copyright in any published or un-
published work in which the copyright was secured before January 1, 1978, and during
the subsistence of any copyright secured on or after that date, the owner of copyright or
of any exclusive right in the work may obtain registration of the copyright claim by deliv-
ering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section, together with the ap-
plication and fee specified by sections 409 and 708. Such registration is not a condition of
copyright protection.
17 U.S.C.A. § 408(a) (West 2005) (emphasis added). For purposes of this survey, "successful sub-
mission" of a registration application covers submission of the deposit, fee, and application, as well
as receipt by the Copyright Office.
13. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1197.
14. Id. at 1197-98.
15. Id. at 1202-03.
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cuit incorrectly decided La Resolana by misinterpreting the registration
requirement and improperly relying on a 2005 amendment to support its
statutory interpretation. This article suggests that the statutory scheme is
inconsistent and requires deference to public policy. This article also
suggests that the United States Supreme Court grant certiorari and adopt
the Application approach in order to ensure that the application of copy-
right law comports with the purpose of the Copyright Act-to unify
copyright law and relax procedural formalities.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Copyright Act of 1976
Before the Copyright Act of 1976, a range of common law and
statutory schemes governed infringement actions throughout the coun-
try.16 Copyright law varied from state to state as did the conditions nec-
essary for its enforcement. 17 Although the Constitution vested copyright
protection in the federal government under the Copyright Clause,' 8 copy-
right protection was not the exclusive province of the federal govern-
ment.' 9 For nearly one hundred and fifty years, copyright protection
developed under a dual system of both state and federal law,20 creating
an inconsistent and confusing set of rules. 2' After the implementation of
the current Act on January 1, 1978, state and federal copyright law con-
verged.22 Congress created a uniform federal copyright system "governed
exclusively" by Title 17 of the United States Code, thus preempting most
State copyright law.
16. Id. at 1198 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 219 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5744).
17. Id. See also, Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 858 (1987) (arguing that the ambiguity of the 1909 Copyright Act forced
courts to stretch statutory boundaries and develop a significant amount of common law interpreta-
tion; "[l]ike many bodies of judge-made law, the common law doctrines were often inconsistent and
contradictory, not only among courts but within courts; not only among lines of cases, but within
lines of cases.") (citing B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 79-97 (1967)).
18. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 cl. 8 (providing that Congress shall have power "to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited time to authors and inventors the exclu-
sive right to their respective writings and discoveries.").
19. SeeLa Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1198.
20. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, at OV-3 (2005).
21. La Resolana 416 F.3d at 1198.
22. NIMMER, supra note 20, at OV-3.
23. Title 17 states:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in
works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within
the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created be-
fore or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by
this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any
such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a) (West 2005) (emphasis added); La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1198 (citing H. Rep.
No. 94-1476 at 130, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746 ("The intention of section 301 is to
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In addition to streamlining copyright law, the 1976 Act eliminated a
number of statutory formalities that served as prerequisites to the exis-
tence of copyrights and recognized a creator's automatic copyright in an
"original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium. 24  Federal
statutory protection was to continue for fifty years25 after the death of the
author regardless of whether the work had been published, registered, or
renewed. 26 The Act also established a "single, centralized, federal regis-
tration system., 27 Under the new system, the existence and maintenance
of copyrights were not dependent upon acquiescence to procedural regis-
tration requirements.2 8 Copyright registration was no longer mandatory,
but voluntary.29
Through the Act, Congress moved from a "conditional" system to
an "unconditional" system and broke with nearly two hundred years of
practice.30  Because authors were no longer required to register their
creations in order to receive copyright protection, Congress implemented
certain registration incentives so as to ensure the continued vitality of an
expansive public record.3' Under the current system, only those authors
who register their copyright may initiate an infringement action in fed-
eral court.32 It is through infringement suits that Title 17's additional
incentives, such as statutory damages, the recovery of attorney's fees,
and injunctive relief function.33 Absent copyright registration, federal
courts shall not exercise jurisdiction and award these remedies. Thus,
authors who have failed to comply with the registration requirement un-
der the Act may have copyrights to their work without any meaningful
way to enforce them.34 Although the Act replaced required formalities
with voluntary formalities, procedural mechanisms remained an integral
part of the American copyright system. In fact, American copyright law
preempt and abolish any rights under common law or statutes of a state that are equivalent to copy-
right.")).
24. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 2005).
25. Today protection continues for seventy years after the death of the author. 17 U.S.C.A.
302(a) (West 2005) ("Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from its
creation and, except as provided by the following subsections, endures for a term consisting of the
life of the author and 70 years after the author's death.").
26. NIMMER, supra note 20, at OV-3.
27. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1198.
28. Sprigman, supra note 2, at 488.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See John B. Koegel, Bamboozlement: The Repeal of Copyright Registration Incentives, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 529,534 (1993).
32. Id. at 529.
33. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1199-1200.
34. But see id. at 1199 n.2 ("Although the Act preempts state copyright law, it does not elimi-
nate all state law actions. For example, conduct that may give rise to a federal suit for copyright
infringement may also give rise to a state law claim in tort for unfair competition, tortuous interfer-
ence, or breach of contract.").
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continued to be characterized by its ministerial focus until the approval
of an important 1988 amendment.35
B. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988
On March 1, 1989, the Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988 (BCIA) took effect 36 and further relaxed the procedural require-
ments of American copyright law.37 The BCIA was enacted in order to
"ally the United States with a set of international rules and regulations,
known as the Berne Convention, that protects intellectual property in the
global marketplace and is adhered to by much of the global commu-
nity.' '38 Adherence to the Berne Convention required United States fed-
eral copyright law to focus on the importance of moral rights, self-
execution, and retroactivity, and forced the country to "sacrifice its ob-
session with copyright formalities., 39 In particular, the Berne Convention
forbid registration as a pre-requisite for copyright protection.4 ° Congress,
however, was reluctant to eliminate registration provisions and endorse
an expansive approach to the amendment's enactment. Instead, Con-
gress opted for a "minimalist" philosophy, whereby it could retain the
current registration system without violating international regulations. 41
After a substantial legislative debate between the House of Repre-
sentatives, which fought to maintain the registration requirement, and the
Senate, which argued to eliminate it, delegates agreed upon a statutory
revision of the Act's registration provision.42 Registration would remain
a condition precedent to the initiation of an infringement action for do-
mestic authors only.43 Because registration is a condition of copyright
enforcement rather than copyright existence, and "loss of copyright," the
destruction of an otherwise existent copyright due to ministerial require-
ments, is the standard for determining the existence of a formality in
contravention of Berne, 44 the United States could avoid offending the
Berne Convention with respect to its own authors. 45 But because the
ability to bring a claim or obtain any kind of relief for copyright in-
fringement is dependent upon a procedural mechanism, "the enjoyment"
of copyright mandated by Berne, which "shall not be subject to any for-
35. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 701[A], at 7-8
(2005).
36. NIMMER, supra note 20, at OV-3, 4; Public Notice 1086, Department of State, 53 Fed.
Reg. 48, 748 (Nov. 22 1988).
37. Id. at OV-5.
38. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1205.
39. NIMMER, supra note 20, at OV-5.
40. NIMMER, supra note 35, at 7-163.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 7-164.
43. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411 (a) (West 2005) ("[No action for infringement of the copyright in any
United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has
been made in accordance with this title.") (emphasis added).
44. NIMMER, supra note 35, at 7-163.
45. Id. at 7-163 to -65.
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mality, ''46 is severely compromised and therefore inapplicable to foreign
works. The United States had appeared to gain accession at the expense
of its domestic authors. The delegates' compromise created two classes
of works: Berne works of foreign origin which were not subject to any
registration formalities, and all other works which were subject to regis-
tration before obtaining infringement action initiation rights.47
Although charged with "hypertechnical casuistry,' '48 the voluntary
registration system for domestic authors did not invoke proscribed for-
malities. Even upon the Copyright Office's refusal to approve a copy-
right registration application, the Act's registration provision allows a
claimant to file suit.49 Furthermore, the registration provision has been
characterized as a "court filing requirement, much like the fees that must
be paid to file a complaint in a United States district court., 50 Sending an
application and diminutive registration fee is a small imposition upon an
international claimant who is already required to pay a much larger filing
fee.5' In this respect, eliminating the registration requirement is a supere-
rogatory action. The analogy between the court filing requirement and
the registration requirement will be significant later in this analysis. The
comparison not only illustrates the small burden imposed by the provi-
sion, but infers that which should satisfy its conditions.
C. The Federal Registration System and Its Purpose
Copyright functions were centralized in the Library of Congress in
1870.52 In 1897, the first Register of Copyrights was appointed and the
Copyright Office became a separate department of the Library of Con-
gress. 53 The Copyright Office is now one of the Library's foremost ser-
vice units, employing over 500 people and receiving approximately
46. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, (Paris
text 1971), art. 5(2).
47. NIMMER, supra note 35, at 7-165 to -66.
48. Id. at 7-164. See also La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1205-06 ("[Rlegistration... [while] not,
technically speaking, a condition for the existence of copyright, . . . is, however a precondition for
the exercise of any of the . . . rights conferred by copyright... This metaphysical distinction be-
tween the existence of a right.., and the exercise of that right [is not] maintainable under.., our
legal tradition which disfavors . . . rights without remedies." (citing S. Rep. No. 100-352, at 18,
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.A.A.N. 3723).
49. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411 (b) (West 2005).
50. NIMMER, supra note 35, at 7-164.
51. For an international claimant:
Given that even under the Senate bill, a Danish author who wished to sue for infringe-
ment of her copyright in Los Angeles, in 1988, for instance, had to pay $120 to the Clerk
for the Central District of California for the privilege of instituting suit, the question
arises why the Senate bill believed it necessary to relieve that Danish author of the further
small burden of spending an additional $[3]0 and sending a form to the Copyright Office
in Washington, D.C.
Id.
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600,000 applications annually.54 Fifty percent of the Copyright Office's
budget and over sixty percent of its employees are committed to the reg-
istration process, making it the Office's single largest business activity."
The placement of the Office was the result of a strategic decision on
the part of Congress to facilitate the quick and efficient selection of de-
posited works for the Library's collections.56 The Library, which is
"recognized as the national library of the United States" is essential to
the research practices of Congress.5 7 Containing "more than 130 million
items on approximately 530 miles of bookshelves," the Library of Con-
gress is the world's largest library.58 Its expansive stature is the result of
the Copyright registration process through which the Library receives the
majority of its collections. 59 Copyright registration has been and contin-
ues to be vital to the existence of the Library, and consequently, to the
efficiency of Congress. Without a federal registration system whereby
creative works are deposited and recorded, both the national government
and the American people would be deprived of "a comprehensive record
of human creativity and knowledge. 6 °  Therefore, when registration
became voluntary in 1976, Congress found it essential to implement
statutory incentives to ensure that authors continued to register their
copyrights.
D. Registration Requirements
The conditions necessary for copyright registration 61 and the bene-
fits conferred upon those in compliance are codified in chapter 4 of Title
17.62 To register a work, three elements must be sent together to the Li-
brary of Congress: a properly completed application form, a nonrefund-
able filing fee (currently $30) and a nonreturnable deposit of the work
being registered.63 Once these items are received, the Copyright Office
reviews the application and determines if the work is copyrightable. 64
Processing time varies depending on the number of applications the Of-
fice is receiving, but an applicant can expect to receive either a certificate
54. Id.
55. UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, STRATEGIC PLAN 2004-2008 12 (2004),
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/strategic2004-2008.pdf.
56. Id. at 5.
57. The Library of Congress, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.loc.gov/about/faqs
(last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
58. The Library of Congress, Fascinating Facts, http://www.loc.gov/about/facts.htm (last
visited Jan. 27, 2006).
59. Id.
60. The Library of Congress, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 57.
61. The debate as to what these conditions entail is the primary subject of this analysis. See
discussion infra Parts III & IV.
62. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 408-12 (West 2005).
63. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR i: COPYRIGHT BASICS, REGISTRATION PROCEDURES
7 (Dec. 2004), http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ0l.pdf.
64. U.S. Copyright Office, I've Mailed My Application, Fee, and Copy of My Work to the
Copyright Office. Now What?, http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-what.html#certificate (last
visited Jan. 27, 2006).
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of registration or a rejection letter within approximately four to five
months.65
Copyright registration has been regarded as a relatively simple proc-
ess.66 However, complications arise when courts are forced to determine
when the benefits of registration are to be conferred. Section 410(d) of
Title 17 explicitly states that, "[t]he effective date of a copyright registra-
tion is the day on which an application, deposit, and fee, which are later
determined by the Register of Copyrights or by a court of competent
jurisdiction to be acceptable for registration, have all been received in the
Copyright Office. 6 7 However, § 410, neither directly confirms nor in-
validates "whether this 'effective date' is indeed effective upon filing or
only once the filer has the copyright certification (or denial) in hand.,
68
Under § 411, authors may only initiate an infringement suit after "prereg-
istration 69 or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accor-
dance with th[e] title" or "where the deposit, application, and fee re-
quired for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in
proper form and registration has been refused[.] '' 70 Keeping in mind that
the purpose of statutory remedies and the grant of federal standing is to
encourage copyright owners to register their work, it is important to ask:
Just what exactly satisfies registration "in accordance" with Title 17? If
copyright claimants can file copyright infringement actions regardless of
whether their applications are approved or rejected, is it really necessary
to condition satisfaction of § 411's registration requirements on the
Copyright Office's review of an application, or are these requirements
satisfied more efficiently upon the successful submission of a registration
application?
E. Preregistration
On April 27, 2005 the Artists' Rights and Theft Prevention Act of
2005 (ART), Title I of the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of
2005 (FECA), took effect, and amended §§ 408, 410, and 411 of Title
17.71 The amendment created a "class of works pending registration
65. Id.
66. Miriam Claire Beezy & Reese A. Pecot, Caveat Emptor or "Let the Buyer Beware":
Applying Diligent Investor Principles to Trademark and Copyright Issues in Mergers and Acquisi-
tions, 17 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14, 21 (2005) (recommending copyright registration as a "sim-
ple, inexpensive process"); Gordon U. Sanford, 1II, An Intellectual Property Roadmap: The Business
Lawyer's Role in the Realm of Intellectual Property, 19 Miss. C. L. REV. 177, 192 (1998) ("Copy-
right registration is also simple and provides many benefits.").
67. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d).
68. Int'l Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass'n v. Power Washers of N. Am., 81 F. Supp. 2d 70, 72
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
69. See discussion infra Parts II.E & IV.C.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (b).
71. Family Entertainment and Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218 (2005); In-
terim Regulation for Preregistration of Certain Unpublished Copyright Claims, 70 Fed. Reg. 61,905
(Oct. 27, 2005) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. Pt. 202) available at
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[that] will support an infringement action. ' '72 As amended, § 411 allows
copyright owners to sue for infringement of preregistered works in addi-
tion to registered works.73 Preregistration, however, is not a proxy for
registration.7 4 Preregistered work "must be registered within one month
after the copyright owner becomes aware of infringement but in no case
later than three months after first publication." 75 ART's amendment to §
408 requires that the Register of Copyrights define and create procedures
for preregistration. 76 At the time La Resolana was decided, the Copy-
right Office had not yet issued its preregisration regulations. 77 Yet de-
spite the absence of guidance from the Copyright Office, the Tenth Cir-
cuit relied on the amendment and the new preregistration scheme to sup-
port its statutory interpretation.7 8 It wasn't until October 27, 2005 that
the Copyright Office's interim regulations were issued.7 9
The procedures established by the Register of Copyrights under §
408 pertain to unpublished works "being prepared for commercial distri-
bution." s  Similar to the registration process, the preregistration process
requires that three elements be sent together to the Library of Congress: a
properly completed application form, a nonrefundable filing fee (cur-
rently $100), and a description of the work being registered.1 Once
these items are received, the Copyright Office conducts a limited review
to "ascertain whether the application describes a work that is in a class of
works that the Register of Copyrights has determined has had a history of
infringement prior to authorized commercial release., 82 After reviewing
the application, "the Copyright Office will provide the claimant official
notification by email of the preregistration. ' 3
Much like registration, "[t]he effective date of preregistration is the
day on which an application and fee for preregistration of a work, which
the Copyright Office later notifies the claimant has been preregistered or
which a court of competent jurisdiction has concluded was acceptable for
http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2005/70fr619O5.htm [hereinafter Preregistration of Unpub-
lished-Interim].
72. LaResolana, 416 F.3dat 1207.
73. 17 U.S.C.A. § 41 l(b).
74. See Preregistration of Certain Unpublished Copyright Claims, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,286,
42,287 (proposed July 22, 2005) available at http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2005/70fr42286.html
[hereinafter Preregistration of Unpublished-Proposed].
75. Id. at 42,290.
76. 17 U.S.C.A. § 408(0(1) ("Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this
subsection, the Register of Copyrights shall issue regulations to establish procedures for preregistra-
tion of a work that is being prepared for commercial distribution and has not been published.").
77. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1207.
78. Id. ("Whatever the Register of Copyrights eventually determines . . . the adoption of
FECA further confirms our statutory analysis").
79. Preregistration of Unpublished-Interim, supra note 71, at 61,905. See discussion infra
Part I.V.(C).
80. Id. at 1207 n.12.
81. Preregistration of Unpublished-Interim, supra note 71, at 61,907.
82. Id. at 61,908.
83. Id.
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preregistration, have been received in the Copyright Office." 4 Unlike
the registration process, however, the preregistration process is elec-
tronic. 85 Hence, preregistrants are spared the registrants' burden of hav-
ing to wait four to five months before their applications are processed
and quite possibly, before they are afforded the right to enforce their
copyright in federal court. Quick or immediate preregistration process-
ing may very well eliminate the need to ask whether the submission of an
application or the approval of an application satisfies the jurisdictional
prerequisites of preregistration. However, the determination of what
constitutes registration for purposes of federal standing is not yet incon-
sequential. Furthermore, allocating rights based on the practices of busi-
nesses rather than the rule of law seems an unwise approach to interpret-
ing either registration or preregistration requirements under the Copy-
right Act.
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT
Federal circuits are split as to whether it is necessary for the Copy-
right Office to review a copyright application in order for an individual
to satisfy the registration requirement and bring an infringement action,
or if an individual can bring an infringement suit upon the successful
submission of a registration application. Whether the split occurred prior
to the La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire8 6 decision or
as a result of the decision, is subject to debate and will be discussed at
the end of this Part. The Tenth Circuit in La Resolana has claimed that
the Fifth and Eleventh circuits have developed two different approaches
to interpreting Title 17 in response to this issue.8 7 The La Resolana court
identified the Fifth Circuit's approach as the "Application approach" and
the Eleventh Circuit's approach as the "Registration approach. 88 For
purposes of this analysis and for reasons explained in Part IV, the "Reg-
istration approach" shall be renamed the "Approval approach."
A. The Application Approach
Courts employing the Application approach have analyzed Title 17
using a "policy-based methodology.8 9  The Fifth Circuit and district
courts in Rhode Island, New York, California, Delaware, and the District
of Columbia have adopted this approach and granted standing to indi-
viduals initiating infringement actions prior to the approval or rejection
of their copyright applications.9" That is, these courts have concluded
that the Act's registration requirement is satisfied once an application has
84. Id.
85. Id. at 61907.
86. 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005).
87. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1201-05.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1203.
90. Id. at 1203-04.
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been successfully submitted. The courts have supported their conclu-
sions by referring to the leading treatises on copyright law written by
Melville B. Nimmer, 91 and the language of § 410(d), which states, "[t]he
effective date of a copyright registration is the day on which an applica-
tion, deposit, and fee which are later determined by the Register of
Copyrights or by a court of competent jurisdiction to be acceptable for
registration, have all been received in the Copyright Office. '92 Courts
embracing the Application approach have argued that "because a copy-
right owner can sue regardless of whether an application for registration
is ultimately granted or rejected, delaying the date on which a copyright
owner can sue is a senseless formality." 93 By allowing a claimant to
initiate suit while her application is pending approval, the courts using
the Application approach prevent infringers from diluting the copied
work during the five to six months it takes to process the claimant's reg-
istration application.
In Apple Barrel Productions, Inc. v. Beard,94 an infringement suit
involving two country music programs, the Fifth Circuit held that the
only elements necessary to confer federal court jurisdiction were proof of
payment of the required registration fee, deposit of the work in question,
and the receipt of a registration application by the Copyright Office.95 In
Lakedreams v. Taylor,96 the same court held that receipt of materials
sufficient to satisfy § 410's statutory formalities could be "inferred from
the testimony of one of Lakedreams' partners that the Copyright Office
cashed the fee check., 97 By construing the registration requirement more
leniently and adopting the Application approach, the Fifth Circuit ad-
hered to the view endorsed by Nimmer, that "in resolving issues of first
impression as to the formalities required under the 1976 and 1909 Acts,
the courts should refrain from overtechnical constructions. 98
In Foraste v. Brown University,99 a case involving the copyright in-
fringement of a number of photographs, the district court of Rhode Island
held that pending registration applications for ninety-seven of the images
in question were sufficient to satisfy the federal jurisdictional require-
ments of § 411.100 Because § 411 entitles a claimant to bring an in-
fringement suit even upon the rejection of her application, and because §
410 "mandate[s] that the merits of the application materials are 'later
91. Id. at 1203.
92. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 410(d).
93. LaResolana, 416 F.3d at 1203.
94. 730 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1984).
95. Apple Barrel Productions, 730 F.2d at 386-87.
96. 932 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1991).
97. Foraste, 932 F.2d at 1108.
98. NIMMER, supra note 35, at 7-9.
99. 248 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D. R.I. 2003).
100. Id. at 76-78. The court further noted that § 411 (a) "confirms that it is the submission of an
application, deposit, and fee (rather than the issuance vel non of a registration certificate) that trig-
gers registration for purposes of conferring standing to sue." Id. at 77 n. 10.
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determined,' that is, determined at some time after the right to sue comes
into being," the court reasoned that application submission was sufficient
to confer federal jurisdiction.'0 ' The court, however, also held that the
plaintiff would not be entitled to damages "until such time as the images
[were] fully registered."' 10 2 While application was sufficient to enable the
initiation of a suit, it did not sufficiently grant a claimant the right to ob-
tain damages under § 412.103 By allowing copyright owners to keep their
case in federal court, yet still maintaining the requirement that an owner
obtain a certificate before acquiring Title 17 remedies, the Application
approach encourages both author protection and statutory compliance.
B. The Approval Approach
Courts applying the Approval approach have analyzed the Act using
the plain language of Title 17 and have determined that a successful ap-
plication submission does not constitute registration for purposes of fed-
eral jurisdiction under § 411.1°4 The Tenth Circuit adopted the Approval
approach in La Resolana.0 5  Before that opinion, no circuit court had
either expressly or clearly championed such an interpretation. However,
in La Resolana, the court concluded that the Eleventh Circuit and district
courts in New York, Maryland, California, Kansas, and South Carolina
had adopted the Approval approach and denied standing to individuals
initiating copyright infringement actions prior to the approval or rejec-
tion of their registration applications. 0 6  Using §§ 410 and 411 of the
Act, the district courts based their opinions on the fact that the "term
application is used in the same section [as the term registration] and is
clearly something separate and apart from registration"'0 7 and the "re-
quirement of 'examination' would be meaningless if filing and registra-
tion were synonymous."' 08 The Eleventh Circuit, however, neglected to
engage in a similar analysis.
In MG.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc.,'0 9 an infringement
case involving two competing home builders, the Eleventh Circuit ac-
101. Id. at 76-77.
102. Id. at 78.
103. As evidenced in Foraste, § 412 has posed a particular problem to photographers. Due to
the nature of their art, the vast number of works created, and inevitable mistakes made on registra-
tion applications, many photographers find it too difficult, expensive, and exhausting to comply with
registration provisions by registering every copyrightable image. Consequently, it may be easy for
defense attorneys to "abuse the registration process, utilizing it as a weapon in infringement litiga-
tion." Charles Ossola, Registration and Remedies: Recovery of Attorney's Fees and Statutory Dam-
ages Under the Copyright Reform Act, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 559, 560 (1995).
104. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1202.
105. Id. at 1201-02 ("Despite the Act's seemingly plain language, courts construing these
provisions are split into two interpretive camps: The "Registration approach," which we have
adopted, and the "Application approach.") (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 1202.
107. Mays & Assocs. v. Euler, 370 F. Supp.2d 362, 368 (D.Md. 2005).
108. Robinson v. Princeton Review, Inc., No. 96 CIV. 4859(LAK), 1996 WL 663880, *7
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
109. 903 F.2d 1486 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
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knowledged that "[t]he registration requirement is a jurisdictional pre-
requisite to an infringement suit.""O To support its claim, the court cited
eight different district court cases."' In only two of those cases did
courts extrapolate from that argument and state that the receipt or denial
of a registration certificate was a jurisdictional requirement." 2  The
Eleventh Circuit in MG.B. Homes never actually addressed what was
necessary to satisfy the registration requirement." 3  Furthermore, and
contrary to the Tenth Circuit's claim in La Resolana, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit did not dismiss the infringement action as premature. 14 In MG.B.
Homes, the court was faced with the task of determining whether the trial
court's dismissal of a suit for lack of jurisdiction precluded it from enter-
taining a party's motion to amend once the party had been issued a regis-
tration certificate.' The Eleventh Circuit held that the "technical dis-
tinction between filing a new complaint and filing an amended com-
plaint" neither precluded the trial court's nor its own jurisdiction." 16 The
court added that the party "acted within the bounds of an arguably ac-
cepted practice" when it filed a complaint asserting copyright registration
prior to receiving a certificate." 17
Not only did the Eleventh Circuit fail to use the Approval approach
by neglecting to address the meaning of registration, it validated the Ap-
plication approach by affirming the trial court's jurisdiction in an in-
fringement action initiated prior to copyright application approval. Con-
sequently, it was not until the Tenth Circuit's decision in La Resolana
that the federal circuits split and the Approval approach was adopted by
an appellate court.
III. LA RESOLANA ARCHITECTS V. CLAYREALTORS ANGEL FIRE" 18
A. Facts
While visiting a building site in Angel Fire, New Mexico in October
2003, a representative of the Santa Fe architecture firm, La Resolana,
discovered that a local realtor had infringed upon a La Resolana copy-
right." 9 Architectural drawings created by La Resolana had been used to
110. Id.at 1488.
111. Id. n.4 (citing cases in Indiana, New York, Arkansas, and Massachusetts).
112. Id. (citing Demetriades v. Kaufnann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Receipt of
an actual certificate of registration or denial of same is a jurisdictional requirement, and this court
cannot prejudge the determination to be made by the Copyright Office."); and International Trade
Management, Inc. v. United States, I Cl. Ct. 39, 41 (1982) ("A suit for copyright infringement is
conditioned on obtaining (or being denied) a certificate of registration.")).
113. See id. at 1486-89.
114. Id. at 1489.
115. Id. at 1488.
116. Id. at 1489.
117. Id. n.6.
118. 416 F.3d 1195 (1Oth Cir. 2005).
119. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1197.
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build a number of townhouses being sold in the area. 120 Clay Realtors,
who had met with La Resolana in late 1996 in a series of discussions
regarding development plans for townhouses in Angel Fire, happened to
be the seller.' 21 In response to this discovery, La Resolana submitted an
application for registration of the copyrighted drawings on November 6,
2003.122 On November 20, La Resolana sued Clay Realtors for copyright
infringement.'
23
Clay Realtors claimed that the court lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion and moved to dismiss on March 8, 2004.124 Because La Resolana
had not obtained a certificate of copyright registration from the Copy-
right Office prior to filing their complaint, Clay Realtors argued that La
Resolana did not have standing to sue.1 25 La Resolana responded with a
March 10, 2004 letter from the Copyright Office. 126 The letter stated that
copyright registration had been approved on January 22, 2004, and that
the effective date of registration was November 19, 2003, one day prior
to commencement of the action. 127 The district court refused to admit the
letter into evidence and found that the drawings were not yet regis-
tered.128 It dismissed the case without prejudice based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and La Resolana appealed.
129
B. Decision
After engaging in the most comprehensive analysis of the two com-
peting registration interpretations to date, the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the district court's holding. 130 The court adopted the Ap-
proval approach, referring to the method as the "Registration ap-
proach,"'131 and reasoned that the plain language of §§ 408 & 410 "re-
quire[d] a series of affirmative steps by both the applicant and the Copy-
right Office."' 132 Because La Resolana's registration application had nei-
ther been approved nor rejected before initiation of the suit, the court
held that La Resolana did not have standing to sue.
133
The court began its analysis with § 411 (a): "no action for infringe-
ment of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until








127. See id. at 1197-98.
128. Id. at 1198.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 1208.
131. See id. at 1201-02.
132. Id. at 1200 (emphasis added).
133. See id. at 1201-02.
[Vol. 83:3
LA RESOLANA V. CLAY REALTORS
accordance with this title."' 34  Because the term preregistration was
added to the statute in a 2005 amendment after commencement of the
suit, and had not yet been defined by the Copyright Office, the court held
that the new language did not control the outcome of the case. 135 Next,
the court attempted to determine the meaning of registration under § 411
by looking to § 410: "[w]hen, after examination, the Register of Copy-
rights determines that ... the material deposited constitutes copyright-
able subject matter ... the Register shall register the claim and issue to
the applicant a certificate of registration."' 3  To "examine" ,and "regis-
ter" a copyright application, and "issue" a certificate of registration, the
Register must act affirmatively. Because the Register "shall register the
claim" only "after examination," and La Resolana's suit was initiated
prior to registration, the court reasoned that La Resolana's suit was pre-
mature. 13 7 According to the court, the process required by § 410 failed to
indicate that the filing of an application alone would be sufficient to reg-
ister the work and confer standing.
138
To support its view that registration did not occur upon application,
the court addressed the language of § 408. According to § 408, a copy-
right claimant "may" obtain copyright registration by successful applica-
tion. Because Congress used "may," a discretionary term, indicating that
the claimant does not automatically obtain registration, rather than the
word "shall," which would mandate registration upon application, the
court found that § 411 could require the Register's substantive review of
the material before conferring jurisdiction. 139 Using the Approval ap-
proach and interpreting the Act using the plain language of Title 17, the
Tenth Circuit thus concluded that registration required approval or rejec-
tion of a copyright application.140
The court, however, disagreed with other courts adopting the Ap-
proval approach, concluding that a registration certificate was not a ju-
risdictional requirement.' 4' According to the court, § 411 demonstrates
"that registration is separate from the issuance of a certificate of registra-
tion .. ,,142 Section 411 makes no reference to a certificate at all, and
even under § 410(c) a certificate of registration is only prima facie evi-
dence of the validity of a copyright, not a condition of registration.
43
Therefore, to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite of registration under
Title 17, the Tenth Circuit required a copyright claimant to wait for the
134. Id. at 1200.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1201.
137. Idat 1201, 1208.
138. Id. at 1201.
139. Id.
140. Id. ("[R]egistration... does not occur until the Register of Copyrights takes action.").
141. Id. at 1202-03.
142. Id. at 1203.
143. See id.; see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 411 (West 2005).
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Copyright Office to process her application before bringing suit, rather
than requiring her to wait for the Copyright Office to issue or deny a
registration certificate. After reaching this conclusion, the court specu-
lated as to how a litigant might demonstrate her copyright registration to
a court in the absence of a certificate. 44 According to the court, an
"owner can still attempt to prove registration through other means, such
as testimony or other evidence from the copyright office."'145 The court
conceded that the "other evidence," "could be a letter similar to the one
presented by La Resolana ... or perhaps an affidavit from a person with
first-hand knowledge of a copyright's registration."'146 Therefore, had La
Resolana appealed the district court's evidentiary ruling excluding the
March 10th letter, and argued its validity as evidence of registration, the




The Approval approach and the Tenth Circuit's opinion in La Reso-
lana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire148 are rife with inconsisten-
cies and traps for unwary copyright owners. Not only did the court mis-
interpret the registration requirement, it confused and mischaracterized
the registration issue throughout the case, ignored valid policy considera-
tions, and erected an unnecessary barrier to copyright protection. The
court also incorrectly claimed that a recent amendment to the Copyright
Act's registration provision would address the detrimental implications
of the court's statutory interpretation. Although the amendment in-
creases copyright protection for certain digital works, the new scheme
does not address the copyrights of authors working outside of the enter-
tainment industry. Preregistration is an inequitable and insufficient solu-
tion to copyright infringement that values economic productivity over
creative control. Together, the Approval approach and the preregistra-
tion scheme fail to address the problem presented in La Resolana as suf-
ficiently as would the Application approach. The Application approach
is thus a sounder method for achieving the dual goals of creative protec-
tion and public progress.
A. Confusing the Issue
In La Resolana, the Tenth Circuit attempted to support its view of
Title 17's registration requirement by mischaracterizing the competing
interpretative approaches, obfuscating the issue, and ignoring valid pub-
lic policy concerns in the face of an inconsistent statutory scheme. La
144. Id. at 1207-08.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1207 n.13.
147. See id. at 1208.
148. 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005).
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Resolana essentially required the court to determine the meaning of "reg-
istration" under § 411. By labeling the Approval approach as the "Regis-
tration approach,"' 149 the court presupposed that its interpretation of the
statute was the correct interpretation. An approach with the title of that
which it seeks to prove is inappropriately aligned with the conclusion
before its argument is even propounded. Thus, before the interpretations
were evaluated, the court automatically established the Application ap-
proach as something separate and apart from registration.
Courts adopting the Application approach never denied that regis-
tration was a jurisdictional prerequisite to a copyright infringement ac-
tion; they merely proposed that the successful submission of an applica-
tion satisfied § 411's registration requirement. 15  The "Approval ap-
proach" is therefore a more appropriate characterization of the Tenth
Circuit's interpretation. The "Approval approach," like the "Application
approach,"''5 1 describes that which will constitute registration under its
interpretation and prevents the court from putting the cart before the
horse, so to speak.
The "Registration approach," was the first of many mischaracteriza-
tions that obfuscated the registration issue and devalued the Application
approach. The court also inappropriately used "[s]ubsequent Acts of
Congress" to support its interpretation. 52  In referring to the 1988
amendment, which created a narrow registration exception for Berne
works of foreign origin, 153 the court misrepresented the question at issue
in La Resolana. After evaluating the congressional debate, and discuss-
ing the important purpose of registration incentives, the court stated, "it
is clear that in passing the original Copyright Act of 1976 and the Berne
Act in 1988, Congress sought to create and retain the incentives to regis-
tration, make certain benefits available only to registrants, and, in fact,
condition federal court intervention on registration of the copyright.'
' 54
The court's argument was a subterfuge used to undermine the credibility
of the Application approach and indicate its inconsistency with legisla-
tive intent to maintain registration incentives. The debate between the
Senate and the House of Representatives addressed the abandonment of
149. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1201-02.
150. See Int'l Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass'n v. Power Washers of N. Am., 81 F. Supp. 2d
70, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Apple Barrel Productions, Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386-87 (5th Cir.
1984); Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1108 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Apple Barrel Produc-
tions).
151. La Resolana states:
Two conflicting interpretations of the Act's registration requirement have been upheld by
circuit courts: 1) registration occurs when the copyright owner submits an application for
registration to the copyright office, or, conversely 2) registration occurs when the copy-
right office actually approves or rejects the application. We hold that the second interpre-
tation is correct.
La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1197 (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 1205.
153. Id. at 1205-06.
154. Id. at 1206.
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the registration requirement altogether, not whether application submis-
sion satisfied registration.' 55
Proponents of the Application approach do not propose to eliminate
registration as a pre-requisite for infringement litigation; they merely
suggest that registration involves fewer formalities than those suggested
by proponents of the Approval approach. 56 Claimants are still required
to submit a fee, deposit, and application in order to register their copy-
rights and receive the benefit of federal standing.' 57 Again, the issue in
La Resolana is what registration requires, not whether it is required.,
58
Consequently, the court's reference to the 1988 amendment neither sup-
ported nor addressed their interpretation of the Act.
The court also obscured the actual issue in La Resolana when it cre-
ated and attacked a fictional argument in favor of the Application ap-
proach. The court addressed "the argument that copyright holders are
left without a remedy until registration,"'159 and dismissed it as
"beg[ging] the question,"' 60 once again mischaracterizing the issue and
misrepresenting the Application approach as an interpretation that sepa-
rates application from registration. Courts adopting the Application
approach have not attempted to support their interpretation of § 411's
registration requirement with the conclusion that owners cannot enforce
their copyrights absent registration. These courts have, however, pro-
ceeded upon this assumption, instead arguing what registration under the
Act should entail.' 61 By implying that these courts rely on an argument
that begs the question, the Tenth Circuit erroneously imposed its own
confusion of the registration issue upon those adopting the competing
approach.
B. Ignoring Valid Policy Considerations
In addition to mischaracterizing the interpretive approaches and ob-
fuscating the issue in La Resolana, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
155. Id. at 1205.
156. See generally id at 1205-06.
157. See, e.g., Int'l Kitchen, 81 F.Supp.2d at 72 ("To best effectuate the interests of justice and
promote judicial economy, the court endorses the position that a plaintiff may sue once the Copy-
right Office receives the plaintiff's application, work, and filing fee."); Apple Barrel Productions,
730 F.2d at 386-87 ("In order to bring suit for copyright infringement, it is not necessary to prove
possession of a registration certificate. One need only prove payment of the required fee, deposit of
the work in question, and receipt by the Copyright Office of a registration application.");
Lakedreams, 932 F.2d at 1108 (citing Apple Barrel Productions).
158. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1197.
159. Id. at 1204.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Int'l Kitchen, 81 F.Supp.2d at 72 ("[I]f Kitchen Exhaust indeed filed its copy-
right application, deposited its work, and paid the appropriate fee before filing suit, the court shall
hear its claims .... "); Apple Barrel Productions, 730 F.2d at 386-87 ("In order to bring suit for
copyright infringement, it is not necessary to prove possession of a registration certificate. One need
only prove payment of the required fee, deposit of the work in question, and receipt by the Copyright
Office of a registration application.").
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failed to give deference to public policy in the face of an inconsistent
statutory scheme. The court stated, "[if] the statutory language is not
ambiguous, and the 'statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,' our
inquiry ends."' 162 In La Resolana, the court concluded that both condi-
tions were met, when in fact, neither were satisified. Section 411 entitles
a copyright owner to sue for infringement "where the deposit, applica-
tion, and fee required for registration have been delivered to the Copy-
right Office in proper form and registration has been refused."' 63 Imag-
ine a situation in which two different copyright owners wish to sue for
infringement of their works. The first owner sends in his registration
application, which is subsequently rejected by the Copyright Office, and
then initiates suit. The second author submits his registration applica-
tion, initiates suit, and then receives a certificate of registration indicating
the approval of his application. By adopting the Application approach in
this situation, both authors will be entitled to protect their work in federal
court. By adopting the Approval approach, however, the author with the
claim involving non-copyrightable material will be afforded the opportu-
nity to protect his work, while the author with copyrightable material will
not. The Approval approach thus effectuates an inconsistent statutory
scheme, a scheme affirmed by the Tenth Circuit in La Resolana. Be-
cause a claimant may bring suit regardless of whether his copyright reg-
istration application is rejected, federal standing is not dependent upon
the result of an application's review by the Copyright Office. Therefore,
it makes little sense to force a claimant to wait until approval or rejection
before bringing suit, and to condition his ability to enforce his copyright
in federal court upon the review of his application.
In addition to denying the author with copyrightable material, and
arguably the more credible claim to protection, the Approval approach
ignores "developments in the law, which continues to move in the direc-
tion of increased control."' 64 While it has been argued that the removal
of copyright formalities has reduced copyright's social utility by "ex-
panding the domain of copyright beyond works for which application of
the law is useful,"'165 the Application approach merely removes an un-
necessary step in a formality that remains intact. Furthermore, § 41 1's
grant of federal standing to authors suing for infringement of non-
copyrightable work is much more likely to improperly expand the scope
of copyright law than will the acceptance of the Application approach.
An author's ability to sue upon the submission of his copyright ap-
plication is also more consistent with the purpose behind Title 17's regis-
tration incentives. By conditioning remedies on the approval or rejection
162. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1200 (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450
(2002)).
163. 17 U.S.C. § 41 ](a).
164. Sprigman, supra note 2, at 487.
165. Id. at 489.
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of a copyright application, a court employing the Approval approach
makes the crucial act that of the Copyright Register rather than that of
the claimant. If the goal of implementing registration incentives is to
encourage authors to submit their work to the Copyright Office, why
condition remedies on an element over which authors have no control?
Copyright infringement remedies do not encourage the Register to ap-
prove or reject applications; therefore, conditioning remedies upon the
Register's acts is an unnecessary formality. By applying the Application
approach and making registration dependent upon the acts of the author,
the goals of the Copyright Act will be achieved in a manner more consis-
tent with public policy and legislative intent. The Library of Congress
will still continue to expand its collections, and copyright infringers will
be prevented from using a ministerial formality as a weapon to avoid
litigating the merits of an infringement claim. Under the Application
approach, stealing original work and diluting it during the Register's four
to five month processing period will no longer save a copyright infringer
from having to pay for his misdeed.
C. The Preregistration Scheme
Because La Resolana initiated suit prior to the enactment of FECA,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did not analyze § 41 1's preregistra-
tion language. 16 6 However, the court claimed that the amendment sup-
ported its statutory interpretation, noting that "the availability of a pre-
registration scheme would in whole or in part address the problem pre-
sented by this case: the need to sue for infringement to prevent dilution
of a copyright but the inability to do so without completed registra-
tion." 167 While the Tenth Circuit was correct in so far as it presupposed
that preregistration would in part address the problem presented by its
decision in La Resolana, the preregistration scheme neither supported the
Approval approach, nor adequately addressed the issue in the case. In-
stead of indicating what might satisfy registration requirements under the
Act, the preregistration scheme added another formality in need of inter-
pretation. Instead of adopting the Application approach and thereby
eliminating the problem of an infringer's opportunity to dilute stolen
copyrights before the commencement of litigation, the court relied on the
possibility that a new amendment would solve the problems it had cre-
ated by adopting the Approval approach.
168
By requiring the review of an application by the Copyright Office
before acknowledging registration under the Act, the court not only de-
nied hearing a meritorious claim, it created an economically dangerous
situation for digital copyright owners. "It's one thing to take someone
else's townhouse blueprints and try to quickly construct them. It's an-
166. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1200.
167. Id. at 1207.
168. Id.
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other thing to capture digital files and begin electronically distributing
them."' 169 Where it might take a number of months to erect a building, a
digital file may be copied in a matter of minutes. Digital files intended
for publication are also often available online before their completion or
publication and well before their commercial distribution. 170 Under the
Approval approach, the four to five months it takes the Copyright Office
to process an application can be economically destructive to digital con-
tent creators. 71 "Obviously, the increasingly frequent situation of copy-
righted works being distributed illegally via the internet before they are
even made available for sale to the public severely undercuts the ability
of copyright holders to receive fair and adequate compensation for their
works."' 172 The preregistration scheme was enacted in response to this
problem. 73 However, employed in conjunction with the Approval ap-
proach, preregistration serves as a Band-Aid for specified authors only;
an incomplete and inequitable solution that elevates the economic con-
cerns of some over the creative control of all.
The Copyright Office's interim regulations note that
"[p]reregistration serve[s] as a place-holder for limited purposes - nota-
bly where a copyright owner needs to sue for infringement while a work
is still being prepared for commercial release."'174 Although preregistra-
tion is not a proxy for registration and preregistered work "must be regis-
tered within one month after the copyright owner becomes aware of in-
fringement but in no case later than three months after first publication,"
preregistration allows an owner to satisfy the requirements necessary to
initiate an infringement action. 175  The regulations, however, identify
only six classes of works eligible for preregistration under the Act: mo-
tion pictures, sound recordings, musical compositions, literary works
being prepared for publication in book form, computer programs (includ-
ing video games), and advertising or marketing photographs. 7 6 The spe-
cific works were chosen by the Register of Copyrights after movie studio
and record company representatives "persuaded Congress that the exist-
ing rules making copyright registration a prerequisite for suit ... [and]
awards of attorney's fees and statutory damages [were] unduly burden-
some on plaintiffs seeking relief against pre-release infringement ....
Because these specific works were determined to have had a "history of
169. Patrick Ross, When a Copyrighted Work Isn't Copyrighted, Posting to The IPcentral
Weblog, http://weblog.ipcentral.info/archives/2005/08/when-a-copyrigh.html#more (Aug. 5, 2005).
170. Preregistration of Unpublished-Proposed, supra note 74, at 42,286.
171. Ross, supra note 169.
172. Preregistration of Unpublished-Proposed, supra note 74, at 42,286 (citing 151 Cong.
Rec. S495 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005) statements of Senator Hatch (bill sponsor)).
173. Id.
174. Preregistration of Unpublished-Interim, supra note 71 at 61,905.
175. Preregistration of Unpublished-Proposed, supra note 74, at 42,290.
176. Preregistration of Unpublished-Interim, supra note 71, at 61,905-06.
177. Preregistration of Unpublished-Proposed, supra note 74, at 42,287.
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infringement prior to authorized commercial distribution"' 78 and
"[b]ecause works intended for publication usually are not registered until
they are in final form and are being disseminated to the public,"' 79 the
registration practices of particular copyright owners dictated the preregis-
tration guidelines. The preregistration scheme thus addresses the detri-
mental implications of the La Resolana decision for a select group of
digital copyright owners only. By affording these authors an opportunity
to gain earlier copyright protection, it acknowledges and remedies "dam-
age to the content creator [that] is obviously going to be far greater, far
quicker [for works that can be immediately electronically distrib-
uted.]' 180 The scheme, however, if viewed as a supplement to the Ap-
proval approach and a solution to these detrimental implications, will not
save future copyright owners, like La Resolana, who do not fall within
the protected classes of the new regulation. Because architectural blue-
prints and photographs for artists' exhibitions and portfolios were not
deemed to have a history of pre-release infringement, owners of unpub-
lished work, like La Resolana and Foraste, whose work has been in-
fringed prior to the approval of a registration application, will not likely
be able to initiate an infringement suit at the same time as owners be-
longing to an enumerated pregistration class. This scheme affords
greater protection to certain owners based on the likelihood of immediate
publication and profit realization rather than legitimate copyrights, and
the likelihood of infringement rather than actual infringement.
Again, imagine a situation in which two different copyright owners
wish to sue for infringement of their works. This time, the first owner
wishes to sue for the infringement of a sound recording which falls
within an enumerated preregistration class. The owner preregisters his
work, sues for infringement, and then submits a registration application
for the work within the time required by the new regulation. His regis-
tration application is then approved by the Copyright Office. The second
copyright owner wishes to sue for the infringement of a building plan
which does not fall within an enumerated preregistration class. This
owner successfully submits a registration application, initiates suit, and
then also receives a certificate of registration indicating the approval of
his application. Under the Approval approach, even though both regis-
tration applications will be approved after the owners have initiated suit,
only the owner with the preregistered sound recording will be afforded
the opportunity to protect his work. Under the Approval approach, even
though both copyrights have been infringed, only the copyright which
was more likely to be infringed will be argued in federal court. Thus,
together, the Approval approach and the preregistration scheme facilitate
an inequitable application of the law where not all copyright owners will
178. Preregistration of Unpublished-Interim, supra note 71, at 61,905-06.
179. Preregistration of Unpublished-Proposed, supra note 74, at 42,286.
180. Ross, supra note 169.
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be able to exercise their rights in the same way. If instead, the preregis-
tration scheme were to coexist with the Application approach, all copy-
right owners would receive equal protection under the Act. By adopting
the Application approach, the law will not discriminate between what is
more and what is less likely to be profitable. Those owners whose prac-
tices prevent them from registering until commercial distribution will
still receive protection, and copyright owners with unpublished work will
receive the same benefits as owners with copyrights having a history of
pre-release infringement.
While the preregistration scheme may address the dilution of copy-
rights for certain classes of copyright owners, its enactment does not
support the Tenth Circuit's adoption of the Approval approach. Preregis-
tration was not created to answer whether or not jurisdictional prerequi-
sites were met by an application's submission or an application's ap-
proval or rejection. It was created in response to the pleas of motion
picture studios and record companies whose profits were being siphoned
away through intemet piracy.' 8' Neither does preregistration indirectly
support the Approval approach. Rather, it imposes additional interpre-
tive burdens upon the court. Instead of indicating what might satisfy
registration requirements under the Act, the preregistration scheme adds
another formality in need of interpretation. The new scheme poses a
problem identical to that of registration; what exactly satisfies preregis-
tration, application submission or application approval?
CONCLUSION
If the purpose of the Copyright Act of 1976 was to relax the proce-
dural mechanisms that made it overly cumbersome for authors to protect
their works, the Tenth Circuit's reading of Title 17 in La Resolana bla-
tantly ignores legislative intent. If an additional goal of the Act was to
create a uniform federal copyright system, the recent split among federal
circuits regarding registration formalities requires a remedy from the
United States Supreme Court. If the Tenth Circuit's interpretive ap-
proach goes unchecked and federal circuits continue to embrace the Ap-
proval approach, by engaging in inconsistent and inequitable interpreta-
tions of the Copyright Act's registration requirement, the balance be-
tween creative ownership and cultural progress will be lost.
As federal copyright law endeavors to encourage creative genius by
increasing the control copyright owners may exert over their creations, it
is important to remember that all copyright owners should be able to
exercise their intellectual property rights in the same way. As federal
copyright law endeavors to enrich the public record in the Library of
Congress by preserving registration incentives, it is important to remem-
181. U.S. Copyright Office, Frequently Asked Questions: Registering a Work,
http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-register.html#length (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
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ber that procedural formalities should not condition rights or benefits
upon that which the copyright owner has no control. By adopting the
Application approach, the Supreme Court will ensure that public policy
and the interests of justice eclipse statutory inconsistencies. The owner
with copyrightable work who initiates an infringement claim after suc-
cessfully submitting a registration application but before receiving notice
of its review, will be afforded the same rights as the owner who initiates
suit after the rejection of his application, and the owner whose preregis-
tered work has yet to be infringed.
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